What's Not to Like?

Looking ahead to Friday, it seems to be shaping up as a lovely evening to fly from KBDR in Bridgeport to KVKX in the DC area. All of the weather indicators are good.

The synoptic picture, courtesy of NCEP, shows high pressure dominating the eastern seaboard as of 00Z Saturday (i.e., 7:00 PM EST). The front running from the Great Lakes southwest to Texas won't be a factor.

The trough that dragged cold arctic air down here to give us a chill the last few days has moved off to the east and the freezing level will be high. The chart at left from ADDS shows the isotherms at the 725mb level (about 9,000 feet). My route will be well south of the 0 degree curve, so even if I can find a cloud it will just be wet. And both the NAM and GFS Model Output Statistics are predicting ceilings above 12,000 feet and excellent visibility across the route.

And finally, I note with some amazement that N631S and I may even get a tailwind! The wind speed chart at left, also from the ADDS site, indicates a bit of a push (maybe 10 or 15 knots) will be on offer for the southbound legs.

This is about as nice a weather picture as one could hope for in mid-November. If the forecasts verify, I'm expecting a beautiful evening flight.

Tweet

It's an AmTrak Day

It's better to be on the ground wishing you were in the air, than the other way around. Or so I've been told.

This is the sky over Bridgeport, just a couple of miles from KBDR. That's about a 2,500 foot ceiling, and it's pretty representative of the whole northeast. The area forecast predicts tops at 8,000 to 10,000. Freezing levels are at 1,000 to 4,000 feet and that more or less tells the tale. Widespread icing conditions are not something either N631S or I can deal with so it's the train for me this weekend.

Of course, the forecast for Monday morning, when I will need to return to Connecticut, calls for fine, clear weather.


Tweet

Go Where the Weather Isn't (cont'd)

The previous post discussed the merits of planning one's route to go where the weather is not. This is such a self-evidently Good Idea that it seems even the airlines do it!

This week we had as a house-guest for a few days a young lady from Europe. On Tuesday she was headed on to Seattle and we took her to KDCA for her flight, Alaska Airlines Flight 3. Our young friend expressed the hope that her flight would not experience much turbulence. I was aware that the middle of the country was enjoying a day of very energetic and unpleasant weather, so I was minimally reassuring.

Alaska Airlines' Dispatcher for Flight 3 was contemplating the same weather system, and this (courtesy of FlightAware.com) is the solution that he or she came up with:

Pretty slick. A good example of the shortest distance between two points not being a straight line (or, in this case, a great circle course). And it's equally true for a Skylane or a 737-800. Of course, we get the fun of being our own Dispatcher.

Tweet

Go Where the Weather Isn't

Better late than never, I'm finally getting around to a post about the flight last Friday from KBDR to KVKX. You might recall that some fairly enthusiastic weather came up the coast on Thursday. By Friday afternoon a deep low was churning up the Gulf of Maine and some continuing weather was wrapping around the back side and descending into lower New England.

I'd been watching the development of the system (first discussed here and then here). Now it was time to deal with it.

The freezing level was predicted to slope from 8,000 feet over North Carolina down to 4,000 feet over Massachusetts. I was concerned that the usual ATC preferred route (west to Pennsylvania then south, at 8,000 to pass over the KEWR arrivals) would encounter icing, so I filed for a route across JFK and down through New Jersey at 6,000.

By 18Z, things were looking promising. At left, the view from my office parking lot, with a broken deck at moderate altitude, clear above. The airport was reporting that ceiling at 4,400 so it looked like punching through the layer to clear conditions could be a viable approach.

Of course, I got an e-mailed notification from FlightAware.com that ATC was intending to issue the "usual route": SAX V249 SBJ V30 ETX V39 LRP V93 BAL direct. They wanted me to go where the weather was and I wanted to go where it wasn't.

At left, the radar picture (base layer) at 2025Z, roughly my time of departure. The composite looked scarier. Between the radar picture and what I could see from my window, I really didn't want to go to the west. So when I finished pre-flighting N631S and was ready to go I called Bridgeport Clearance Delivery:

N631S: "Bridgeport Clearance, Skylane 631 Sierra IFR to VKX; you're going to read me a clearance that starts with "radar vectors to Sparta." I'm going to be unable to accept that due to icing conditions on that route. I need something that starts with "Vectors to Deer Park, thence Victor 16."
KBDR Clearance: "31 Sierra, you want to go V16 over JFK?"
N631S: "Affirmative."
KBDR Clearance: "OK, stand by, let me talk to them."

I'd been here before and wasn't very optimistic about New York Approach being in a cooperative mood. They really want the southbound traffic to swing out to the west. But as the minutes passed, I started to be a bit hopeful. After all, it doesn't take any time at all to say, "NO!" Sure enough, after ten minutes I heard:

KBDR Clearance: "31 Sierra, we've got it, just give me a couple more minutes to work out the other end of the route," followed two minutes later with, "31 Sierra, advise ready to copy."
N631S: "31 Sierra, go ahead."

The clearance I got was: Vectors to DPK V16 DIXIE V1 ATR V308 BILIT direct DCA direct. The back half of that would have to be re-negotiated en route - there was no way that Potomac Approach would let me go to DCA, and Waterloo (ATR) was out of the way - but the front half served to get me outta town. Sold!

The METAR in effect at KBDR when I took off was:

 
KBDR 151952Z 27020G29KT 10SM FEW040 BKN110 13/05 A2936 RMK PK WND 31033/19270

20 knots of wind gusting to 29 is fairly sporty, but it was nearly aligned with Runway 29 and so not a problem. The lower cloud deck had opened up to "few at 4000" above the airport, but I could see more solid cloud coverage to the south.

I was happy to find that my assigned altitude of 6,000 feet initially put me on top of the cloud deck. By the time I got to JFK the tops had risen a few hundred feet so that I was in and out of the layer. The temperature aloft was 30F but I was never in the clouds long enough to accumulate any ice.

In due course, New York Approach handed me off to McGuire and McGuire handed me off to Atlantic City. It was time to do something about that clearance.

N631S: "Atlantic City Approach, Skylane 631 Sierra, request."
A.C. Approach: "31 Sierra, go ahead."
N631S: "My current routing has me going by way of Waterloo and DCA and I know Potomac Approach doesn't want me going to DCA. Can you work out something like after LEEAH, V268 to Smyrna then V379 to Nottingham thence direct?"
A.C. Approach: "31 Sierra, let me talk to Dover and see what they're willing to do."

A.C. Approach was back in five minutes with a re-route: Present postion direct ENO V16 CHOPS V308 OTT Direct. OK, I liked it. The red line on the chart clip above at left (courtesy of Skyvector.com) is my original routing. The blue line is the re-route. One of the nice things about the blue-line route is that it avoids a fairly long leg over water going down to Waterloo (ATR). I will do single-engine over water beyond gliding distance to land, but I never like it.

The balance of the trip was uneventful. And once again I am appreciative of ATC's professionalism and flexibility, essential to making this flight on a day with interesting weather.

Tweet

4,000 Hours

Not me...the airplane! This morning, a bit less than an hour after departure from KVKX en route to KBDR, the tachometer rolled to 4000.0 hours. This, exactly 33 years and 7 months from the date - 18 March 1977 - that N631S first rose from a runway into the sky over Wichita.

Looking back at the logs, I see that the first 1,000 hours took about six years, as did the second. The third 1,000 hours took 12 and 1/2 years and the last thousand took nine years. Over the years, the aircraft has built time at an average rate of 119.1 hours/year. N631S has been with me since late September of 2004; since then we've flown 755 hours together.

It's interesting that the Vref aircraft valuation service provided by AOPA says that the fleet average total time for '77 Skylanes is 3960 hours; as of now N631S is almost perfectly average.

N631S is, to me, a nicely-broken-in airplane in the prime of its life. With continued good maintenance and a pattern of regular use, 31 Sierra can look forward to many more years of reliable usefulness.

Marginal Weather

The weather remains less than encouraging. At this writing (0030Z) it is raining zealously here in Connecticut and the forecasts are marginal at best. To begin with there are these Terminal Area Forecasts (TAF's) for Bridgeport and Washington National:

 
KBDR 142352Z 1500/1524 04010KT 2SM +RA BR BKN015 OVC025 
     FM150400 34010KT 5SM -RA BKN015 OVC040 
     FM150800 32013G20KT P6SM SCT015 BKN040 
     FM151500 30018G28KT P6SM BKN040 
     FM151800 29020G33KT P6SM BKN040
        
KDCA 142329Z 1500/1524 33009KT P6SM FEW080 SCT250 
     FM150600 27010G18KT P6SM SCT060 
     FM151300 28010G20KT P6SM SCT060 
     FM151600 30015G25KT P6SM BKN060 
     FM152200 29010KT P6SM SCT250

For a 21Z departure, the southern end of the trip would be fine but the departure presents issues. The surface winds will be sporty, 20 knots gusting to 33 from the northwest, but that's not the problem. The problem is the 4,000 foot ceiling considered in light of the anticipated freezing level. Here's the latest on that:

At left, the forecast temperatures at the 800mb level at 00Z tomorrow (about 6,000 feet MSL). As noted in the previous post, the 8,000 foot routing over eastern Pennsylvania just isn't going to work. In fact, unless actual conditions are better than the current forecast, 6,000 feet over JFK is also not likely to work. What I really need is 4,000 feet over JFK and I rather doubt that New York Approach will be happy to give me that.

So here's Plan A: File for 6,000 over JFK thence Victor 16 down through New Jersey, and if the 18Z weather says that is unwise, refile for 4,000 and see how ATC feels about that. Plan B would be to depart VFR and fly to New Jersey via the Hudson River Skyline Route at about 2,500 feet, proceeding to Toms River (KMJX); land there and file IFR at 4,000 feet from there to KVKX.

And, I guess, Plan C is AmTrak.

'Winter Is Icumen In'

Winter is icumen in,
Lhude sing Goddamm,
Raineth drop and staineth slop,
And how the wind doth ramm!
--Ezra Pound (1915)

Looking ahead to Friday's weather has me in an unhappy mood. Here is a picture of the reason for my discontent, courtesy of NOAA's Aviationweather.gov:

This shows the forecast for the 850mb pressure level (i.e., about 5,000 feet MSL) on Friday evening at 00Z. It's based on the NAM model run at 18Z today. The precipitation data is for the period from 18Z to 00Z and the blue curve is the 0 degree C isotherm. (If you click on the image you'll get to see the uncropped version.)

With my usual departure time from Bridgeport's KBDR of around 21Z, it doesn't look like I'll be dealing with much precipitation. But I anticipate low to medium ceiling heights and a fairly low freezing level (reference that 0 deg. isotherm). It seems unlikely that the "usual routing", at 8,000 feet over to Sparta and Allentown, will work due to probable icing conditions. I might get away with a route over JFK and down the New Jersey coast at 6,000 feet. If I can get my friends at ATC to clear me that way.

If ATC is uncooperative, I might (as a last resort) be able to file to an intermediate destination in New Jersey (possibly KMJX, Miller Airpark in Toms River), land there, and refile to KVKX from that point. That would probably game the system but it's irritating to have to contemplate such subterfuge.

We shall await developments...

Bernoulli vs. Newton

Today, at the wonderful XKCD:

(When you click on the image, be certain to "mouseover" and read the alt text.)

No Surprises

The weather at departure from KVKX on Monday was wet, as anticipated. The NEXRAD radar image at left was recorded at 1151Z, just about the time that N631S and I were lifting off. Widespread light showers were the order of the day. The conditions at National Airport and at Andrews AFB were:

 
KADW 041149Z AUTO 35013KT 8SM RA OVC005 10/10 A3009 RMK AO2 CIG 004V007 SLP193
KDCA 041147Z 35012KT 2 1/2SM RA BR BKN014 BKN022 OVC038 11/09 A3012 P0002

For once, conditions at KVKX were closer to those at KDCA than KADW. On climbout, N631S entered the overcast at about 1,200 feet, well above the 500 foot ceiling Andrews was reporting.

After that it was pretty much in the schmoo until the clouds broke up at 7,000 feet over Dover AFB. For the trip across New Jersey it was entirely VMC between the layers, with lots of sunshine, until arriving in the New York area. There was another area of thick clouds and precipitation over Long Island. The rain didn't extend across the sound into Connecticut but the cloud cover did. The image below, from 1350Z, shows the extent of the precipitation at arrival.

So N631S and I descended through the clouds over JFK and were vectored for the ILS approach to Runway 6 at Bridgeport. We broke out of the overcast at about 1,500 feet, a few miles from the threshhold. The surface wind was gusty but from the northeast in line with the runway, and the landing was uneventful.

---

The folks at NOAA's National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) have a new Beta version of their Weather and Climate Toolkit available here. It has the ability to integrate Google Earth imagery with historical NEXRAD data (I've blogged about the historical radar image tools in an earlier post). The radar images above are examples - I think it's pretty cool!

Another Rainy Monday

Looks like another rainy Monday morning in store. At left is a clip from the 24-hour forecast map from the NCEP site, valid at 12Z. As I plan to depart KVKX (in the DC area) about that time headed for KBDR (Bridgeport, CT), I anticipate a damp flight. From the position of the low I also expect headwinds due to the cyclonic flow.

For departure conditions, lets look at the Terminal Area Forecasts (TAF's) for Washington National (KDCA) and Andrews AFB (KADW).

 
KDCA 031739Z 0318/0418 04012KT P6SM BKN028 BKN040 OVC060 
     FM032000 02010G17KT P6SM -RA OVC025 
     FM040100 02011G18KT 6SM -RA OVC020 WS020/04035KT 
     FM040500 36015G21KT 5SM -RA BR BKN012 OVC020 
     FM040900 35013G20KT 4SM -RADZ BR OVC008 
     FM041400 33012G20KT 5SM -RA BR OVC009
        
KADW 0317/0417 03010G15KT 9999 BKN020 OVC030 QNH2997INS 
     TEMPO 0317/0320 SCT020 OVC030 
     BECMG 0405/0406 36012KT 4800 -RA BKN010 OVC020 QNH3000INS 
     BECMG 0412/0413 35012KT 9999 NSW BKN020 OVC030 QNH2998INS
 

The pertinent part of the DCA forecast (the line starting "FM040900", meaning "From 09Z on the 4th") predicts winds from the north at 13 knots gusting to 20, four miles visibility in light drizzly rain and mist and an 800 foot overcast, continuing through 14Z.

The Andrews forecast predicts conditions becoming, between 12Z and 13Z, wind of 12 knots from the north, good visibility with "no significant weather" (NSW) and a broken ceiling at 2,000 feet, overcast above at 3,000. This is one where I hope the Zoomies have it right!

In either case, the forecast conditions are good enough to depart. How about the arrival a couple of hours later?

KBDR 031720Z 0318/0418 04014G20KT P6SM SCT040 
     FM031900 04014G22KT P6SM BKN035 BKN100 
     FM040500 05020G25KT 6SM -RA SCT012 OVC020 
     FM041300 05020G26KT 5SM -RA OVC012

The Bridgeport TAF predicts northeast wind of 20 knots gusting to 26, with five miles visibility in light rain, overcast at 1,200 feet, from 13Z. That's a sporty wind but it's nicely aligned with Runway 6. The ILS approach will be on offer and the high ceiling ought to make for a straightforward arrival.

With rain forecast at both ends of the flight there's a good chance of getting wet en route. It's October now, so the vital question becomes, "Where will the freezing level be?"

The image at left is clipped from the ADDS - Winds/Temps page. It shows where the isotherms (especially the zero degree curve) will be at 12Z tomorrow. This one is for the 725 millibar level - about 9,000 feet. If I file for 7,000 feet I'll be comfortably below the freezing level all the way along my route.

One other item to note. The nice folks at FltPlan.Com are telling me to expect an average tailwind component of +2 knots at 7,000 feet but an average headwind component of -17 knots at 5,000 feet. That is a lot of wind shear! The predicted time for the flight is 2:02 at 7,000 and 2:20 at 5,000. Of course it isn't that simple.

Potomac Approach will want me at 7,000 feet above the KBWI arrivals and New York Approach will, for their own mysterious reasons, want me at 5,000 feet over the top of KJFK. So, I'll file for 7,000 (secure in the knowledge that the temperature will be warm enough to keep water in the liquid phase) and try to convince ATC to let me stay up there as long as possible to avoid the headwind at 5,000.

Not a Day for Flying

Last night when I toddled off to bed, I expected to be flying this morning. Really. The 00Z TAF for Bridgeport was calling for 4 miles visibility with a 900 foot overcast and wind favoring the ILS runway. But when I awoke this morning things had changed. This was the TAF on offer for KBDR at the time:

TAF KBDR 270522Z 2706/2806 06012G18KT P6SM VCSH OVC012
         FM270700 07012G18KT 5SM -DZ BR VCSH OVC008
         TEMPO 2709/2712 3SM -DZ OVC005 
         FM271200 09012KT 2SM -RA BR OVC005 
         FM271900 10010KT 1SM -RA BR OVC004=

So now we were looking at deteriorating conditions with a trend toward 500 foot ceilings and 1 to 3 mile visibility. A look at the NEXRAD radar seemed to indicate that large patches of heavier precipitation were headed toward Connecticut and could well be arriving about the same time that N631S and I would.

To complicate matters further, the conditions down in the DC area were poor. The METAR at Andrews AFB said:

SPECI KADW 271024Z AUTO 09004KT 9SM DZ OVC003 18/18 A2990
           RMK AO2 DZE0957B1024 SLP124=

And the TAF for Andrews was no more encouraging:

TAF KADW 2709/2809 05009KT 3200 -RA BR OVC003 QNH2983INS
         TEMPO 2712/2718 OVC005
         BECMG 2717/2718 15010G15KT 4800 RA BR OVC008 QNH2979INS
         BECMG 2723/2724 16009KT 4800 -RA BR OVC008 QNH2971INS
         T24/2720Z T15/2710Z LIMITED METWATCH 2709 TIL 2710=

We're looking at 300 foot ceilings and an expectation of falling visibility. Of course, I could take off, but there'd be no getting back into the departure airport, KVKX, if anything went wrong.

The low ceiling and visibility conditions were widespread, as well. There wasn't even a really good alternate.

Personal minima came into play here. I'll take off knowing that I might find 400-and-2 at the other end of the trip if I have a gold-plated alternate. That luxury was not available today. So, I opted to make the trip by train. As the wise man said, better to be on the ground wishing you were flying, than the other way around.

"Some National Security Thing"

Apropos of nothing that this post will talk about, let me start with the pretty bird at left - a Globe Swift that seems to act as the mascot for Volo Aviation at KBDR. It nests there among the Gulfstreams and the Challengers and makes it a pleasure to walk past the open hangar door.

I snapped the Swift's picture on my way to N631S Friday afternoon. My flight plan called for a 2030Z departure toward KVKX and I was already anticipating a long-ish trip due to forecast headwinds in the range of 35 to 40 knots. FltPlan.com was telling me to expect 2:31 en route.

I pre-flighted N631S, picked up my clearance, started the engine and was cleared to taxi to Runway 24. By 2033Z I was at the hold short line and transmitted, "Bridgeport Tower, Skylane 631S ready for Runway 24 at Hotel." There was no immediate response.

Then, for something completely different, the tower controller said, "ATC has just informed us that it will be at least 20 minutes before they can issue any IFR releases. N631S, say intentions."

"N631S would like to make a 180 and return to parking to wait it out." No point in continuing to burn avgas. That was approved as requested and I went back and shut down.

For most of the week there'd been a TFR covering the maximum lateral area of the New York Class "B" airspace, from the surface to 18,000 feet, due to the United Nations General Assembly meeting. Now, that was ending and I inferred that assorted Presidents, Potentates and Supreme Leaders were getting out of town - which overloaded both ATC and the security apparatus.

I kept the hand-held radio tuned to KBDR's ground control frequency and after about 15 minutes heard, "631 Sierra, are you up?" I responded with, "31 Sierra is up," and got back, "31 Sierra, go ahead and start your engine. I believe we can get you out of here."

So N631S and I were back at the hold-short line at 2051Z and this time got an immediate release. But that doesn't mean the fun was over.

After takeoff from Runway 24, I contacted New York Approach and got the customary vector to the north. A couple miles later, I received a non-customary "Skylane 31 Sierra, turn right to a heading of 060, vector for spacing to Carmel - eventually. We'll try to get you headed back west in ten miles or so."

The green track shown above (courtesy of the useful folks at FlightAware.com) shows my peripatetic departure. During this tour, I heard a helicopter inbound from the north calling New York Approach:

[345AB]: "New York, Helicopter 345AB. We had a flight plan filed for pickup to get into the Bravo, but Bradley just dumped us."

[Approach]: "Helicopter 345AB, say destination."

[345AB]: "5AB is headed to Newark."

[Approach]: "Helicopter 5AB, yeah, they've got some national security thing down there. We've been advised absolutely no more helicopters into the airspace. Say intentions." (I'm starting to think that "Say intentions" may be one of the most unwelcome phrases in the language.)

[345AB]: "OK, I guess 5AB will land at White Plains."

After that, Approach issued them an appropriate vector and frequency change. And, they finally got N631S headed west, slowly. I was getting ground speeds of 95 to 100 knots which implies a headwind component of about 40 knots. Considering the delays so far, it was becoming clear that I'd get to enter the first time of this season in the Night column of my log.

Plodding along near Carmel (CMK), this exchange got a smile from me:

[804L]: "Approach, Baron 804L, request."

[Approach]: "Zero four Lima, say request."

[804L]: "They've got us way up here by Barrington, way out of our way...any chance of direct BREZY from here?"

[Approach]: (without any hesitation) "No!"

[804L]: "Okaaayyy..."

After entering Allentown's airspace I requested and got a descent from 8,000 to 6,000 feet that got me about 5 more knots of groundspeed. Also, the wind out of the southwest eased a bit (to a mere 30 knots or so) so by the time Baltimore was coming into view the Garmin 530W was telling me I was up to 112 knots or so. And the sun had set.

The first night landing of the season was uneventful. I picked up the airport beacon about 10 miles from the field, reported the field in sight and got, "Skylane 31 Sierra, cleared for the visual approach, proceed directly to VKX, frequency change is approved." I cancelled IFR, made my traffic calls, and entered the right downwind for 24. The runway was right where it was supposed to be, and I had wheels on pavement at 2346Z. 2 hours + 55 minutes airport-to-airport, 3.2 tach hours with all of the thrashing around. It was nice to have that one in the can.

Here's the track for the whole trip:

IFE

The second most intense event in aviation, short of having an emergency develop on your own aircraft, may be to hear another pilot on the frequency dealing with an emergency of his or her own. It certainly concentrates one's attention.

This morning, not very long after departing KVKX and climbing to 7,000 feet MSL, we (that's me and N631S) were crossing Delaware and doing business with Dover Approach.

As is common, I listened as the Dover controller cleared a departing flight - REACH 7045 - to climb on course. He called the departure as traffic for a northbound Beech Baron, saying, "Traffic is a C-5, Heavy, climbing to 11,000." Soon thereafter, Dover Approach transmitted, "REACH 7045, contact Washington Center on..." and gave them a frequency. The big Lockheed transport was gone on its way.

About ten minutes later, an unexpected call: "Dover Approach, REACH 7045, at 5,000, we need a straight-in visual to Runway 32." I took note - wasn't that the call sign of the C-5 that just departed?

The controller responded calmly, saying, "REACH 7045, I understand you have an IFE. You are cleared for the visual, Runway 32."

IFE? In Flight Emergency? The C-5 must have reported an emergency to Washington Center and turned back to Dover. Center had undoubtedly called Dover Approach with a "heads up."

The C-5 Galaxy responded with, "Understand cleared visual Runway 32. We'll be on the ground in ten minutes. We'd like a truck standing by."

From Approach, "REACH 7045, are you declaring an emergency? If we need to roll the equipment, that's the only way they'll respond."

"OK, yes, we are declaring an emergency," said the Galaxy pilot, and Approach asked, "What is the nature of your emergency."

"We have smoke and fumes in the aircraft."

Approach asked, as they must, "Say souls on board and fuel on board in time," which elicited "10...no, 11 souls on board and three hours of fuel."

OK, deep breath. Remember Swissair 111. Remember the recent UPS crash in the Middle East. This is as serious as a heart attack. This can turn completely to...well, you know...in a matter of minutes. At this point, I'm rooting for the C-5 crew. The guy handling the radios sounds cool and calm. They have many more options than the crew of the UPS flight that augured in recently; they have access to the cargo deck and they have troops ("11 souls on board") that can try to attack the problem. Still...get it on the ground!

"REACH 7045, contact tower on 126.35."

"Tower on 26.35...REACH 7045." I reached toward my Number 2 Comm radio to dial in the Tower frequency but heard on Comm #1, "Skylane 31 Sierra, contact Atlantic City Approach on 126.4." Damn! "31 Sierra, A.C. Approach 26.4, thanks and so long," and a quick switch. "Good morning, Atlantic City Approach, Skylane 631 Sierra level 7,000." As I waited for Atlantic City to respond to my check-in I dialed up Dover Tower on #2.

"Skylane 631 Sierra, good morning, Atlantic City altimeter is 30.22." I no sooner said, "30.22 for 31 Sierra" when I heard over the Dover frequency, "Tower, REACH 7045 will clear the runway and then stop to meet the trucks." They had to be getting close. From Tower, "REACH 7045, will you clear at Charlie or at Golf?" Good for the Tower controller! He's getting the information he needs to direct the emergency equipment to the correct taxiway. These guys are well trained! "We'll clear at Charlie," was the answer.

Perhaps a minute later, "REACH 7045 is clear of the runway." From Tower, "REACH 7045, the equipment is with you, contact ground on 118.87."

And that was that! An Air Force crew had a really interesting morning, and I got to listen in. Everyone involved sounded sharp and in control. And luck was with them today. This was a live, in-the-moment reminder that there is only one acceptable response to smoke in the aircraft - land, NOW! We fly and we learn.

Nothing to Report

"An uneventful journey is a good journey for the technician."
-- N.S. Norway (a.k.a. Nevil Shute)

Last evening's flight from KBDR to KVKX was exceptional only by virtue of its exceptionally unexceptional nature. After most flights I can (and do) look back and reflect on lessons learned, errors of omission or commission to be avoided in the future, and points of interest to be shared. It's a rarity to be unable to fill any of these categories.

Preflight, startup and takeoff were uneventful, climb-out was more efficient that usual (with a minimum of vectors from ATC for sequencing at Sparta) and soon N631S and I were on top in the sunshine.

The winds aloft had only a modest effect on progress, with ground-speed for most of the trip close to 130 knots - that's pretty good for the westbound portions. Controllers offered up several small but helpful shortcuts. After Lancaster (LRP) we descended to 6,000 feet and that had us beneath the broken ceiling as far as Baltimore (BAL); after that, clear skies.

Arriving in the DC environs, the visibility was very good and it was easy to pick up the home 'drome (KVKX) visually. And the landing was great (i.e., I get to use the airplane again).

So I got to log 2.3 hours of pleasant aviating and wound up with little to talk about. In short, the best kind of flight.

---

An administrative note: For some time I've been bothered by the long, narrow strip of blog-space in the lower reaches of the sidebar. So I've done some housekeeping; it's now occupied by an entirely idiosyncratic list of aviators and aircraft designers whom I have long admired. Most of the photos link to something interesting. I hope you'll have a look around down there. Comments always welcome. (Hat tip to Captain Dave of Flight Level 390, whose similar feature inspired this one.)

Mid-Air Over the Hudson - Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) met a couple of days ago in Washington to approve the final report on the "Hudson River Mid-Air." Just over a year ago (9 Aug 2009) a transient Piper Lance and a sight-seeing helicopter collided over the river. The mishap was fatal for all nine occupants of the two aircraft.

The Board has made a synopsis of the final report available on its web site. (The report itself is in final editing and won't be posted for a couple of weeks.) The synopsis contains recommendations, conclusions and a statement of Probable Cause:

"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was (1) the inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept, which made it difficult for the airplane pilot to see the helicopter until the final seconds before the collision, and (2) the Teterboro Airport local controller’s nonpertinent telephone conversation, which distracted him from his air traffic control duties, including correcting the airplane pilot’s read back of the Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR) tower frequency and the timely transfer of communications for the accident airplane to the EWR tower. Contributing to this accident were (1) both pilots’ ineffective use of available information from their aircraft’s electronic traffic advisory system to maintain awareness of nearby aircraft, (2) inadequate Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) procedures for transfer of communication among air traffic control facilities near the Hudson River class B exclusion area; and (3) FAA regulations that did not provide adequate vertical separation for aircraft operating in the Hudson River class B exclusion area." (emphasis added)

Several of the Board's conclusions, as contained in the synopsis, relate to the inadequacy of "see-and-avoid" as a strategy for avoiding mishaps like this one (in each case, emphasis added):

• "The airplane pilot may have believed that no other potential traffic conflicts existed because he had not received additional traffic advisories, but the pilot was still responsible for seeing and avoiding other traffic."
• "The helicopter would not have been obscured from the airplane pilot’s view but would likely have been difficult for him to detect until the final seconds before the collision because, before that time, the helicopter would have appeared as a relatively small and stationary object against a complex background of buildings."
• "The airplane would likely have been in the helicopter pilot’s field of view until 32 seconds before the collision, after which time the airplane was above and behind the helicopter and was outside the pilot’s field of view."
• "The guidance in Advisory Circular (AC) 90-48C, “Pilots’ Role in Collision Avoidance,” could better assist pilots’ efforts to establish effective see-and-avoid skills if the AC were to recognize current challenges that pilots encounter in managing their see-and-avoid responsibilities, including complex, high-density airspace and the increasing presence of technology in the cockpit."

So, in sum, the airplane pilot was responsible for seeing and avoiding conflicting traffic; it was difficult (maybe impossible) for him to detect the conflicting aircraft before it was too late to avoid a collision; the helicopter pilot was completely unable to see the fixed-wing aircraft; and the FAA's existing guidance on "see-and-avoid" (AC 90-48C), is obsolete (having been issued on 18 March 1983) and not comprehensive.

None of this comes as news. I've written about this event and its aftermath in six previous posts ( 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 ). In the first of these posts, written about a week after the mishap, I linked to a 1991 report published by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) titled Limitations of the See and Avoid Principle. This very well written report effectively demolishes the notion that unalerted "see-and-avoid" can be an effective strategy for collision avoidance.

In that post a year ago, I wondered if "...a technological aid like the TIS system shown above, could be required for commercial operators and strongly urged for non-commercial users of the Hudson airspace." I claim no prescience, but in its recommendations, the NTSB has netted out to the same place. Here (among other recommendations) is what they are proposing (again, emphasis added):

• "Update Advisory Circular 90-48C to reflect current-day operations, including (1) a description of the current National Airspace System and airspace classifications, (2) references to air tour operational areas as high-volume traffic environments, and (3) guidance on the use of electronic traffic advisory systems for pilots operating under the see-and-avoid concept."
• "Develop standards for helicopter cockpit electronic traffic advisory systems that (1) address, among other flight characteristics, the capability of helicopters to hover and to fly near other aircraft at lower altitudes, slower airspeeds, and different attitudes than fixed-wing airplanes; (2) reduce nuisance alerts when nearby aircraft enter the systems’ alerting envelope; and (3) consider the different types of operations conducted by helicopters, including those in congested airspace."
• "Once standards for helicopter electronic traffic advisory systems are developed, as requested in Safety Recommendation [4], require electronic news gathering operators, air tour operators, and other operators of helicopters used for passenger revenue flight to install this equipment on their aircraft."

"See-and-avoid" has been a cherished part of the freedom to fly as it's practiced in the US. And it can continue to be so, but the time has come to acknowledge that for high traffic areas "see-and-avoid" must be augmented with effective alerting technology.

In her opening statement for the meeting, NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman made these observations (emphasis added):

"What I find so striking about this accident is that the airplane pilot was simply following his directions. And although the helicopter’s conspicuity was improved by anticollison lights and a high-visibility paint scheme on the blades – these enhancements didn’t help. Both aircraft were equipped with radios and traffic information systems, yet they didn’t hear or see each other, and the technology did not prevent the accident, and the air traffic system neither separated them nor alerted them that they were about to collide.

...

I might add that the ability to avoid future accidents like this one is dependent on a fully implemented ADS-B (automatic dependence surveillance-broadcast) program. The FAA has taken the initial steps to move towards an ADS-B-based ATC environment, but that is an expensive proposition. If we are serious about changing the paradigm and moving forward, then it’s critical that ADS-B, both in and out, be a part of this next phase of safety for collision avoidance."

The last part of this statement is quite controversial, as ADS-B (especially the "in" part) has no shortage of detractors. But some enhancing technology is needed and ADS-B is on the program.

There's a lot more that's of interest in the Board's synopsis (including some fairly severe criticism of ATC's involvement in the mishap). I urge you to read it, along with the final report when it issues.